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athaniel Hawthorne’s The Blithedale Romance 
participates in the antebellum discourse on labor, 
the complicated discussion in America over the meaning of 
work in the middle of the nineteenth century. As Nicholas 
K. Bromell recognizes in his study By the Sweat of the 
Brow: Literature and Labor in Antebellum America, during 
that critical period, “the nature and the meaning of work 
were anxiously discussed and contested as new ideological 
N
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formations were developed to explain and justify new work 
practices” (1). These “new ideological formations” that were 
designed to understand and manage the changing meaning 
of work as the Industrial Revolution progressed not only 
impacted labor proper but also held deep ramifications 
for the labor of the mind and of creative production. 
Antebellum writers such as Hawthorne were prompted “to 
revise accepted notions of creativity and to rethink both 
the aims and means of their artistic practice” if they were 
to survive and flourish in the changing cultural landscape 
of industrial America (15). In The Blithedale Romance, 
Hawthorne reveals his deep anxiety over both the “new 
ideological formations” that attempted to reformulate the 
standards by which literary work operated and his own effort 
to “revise accepted notions of creativity.” The contested 
relationship between aesthetic practice and labor ideology 
can be seen in the conflicting relationship between Coverdale 
and Hollingsworth and their troubled relationship with the 
Blithedale experiment. 
 Through Coverdale’s Blithedale adventure, 
Hawthorne investigates the crisis of the Romantic writer, 
with his romantic aesthetic of the sympathetic imagination, 
and his imminent collision with modernity, represented 
by Hollingsworth’s embrace of industrial morality. As 
Frank Christianson recognizes, “The Blithedale Romance 
. . . stages an aesthetic contest that takes the sympathetic 
imagination as that element of Romanticism which must 
be redefined in order to ensure a place for literature in 
the modern world” (247). To understand the relationship 
3
between the “aesthetic contest” in Blithedale and the need 
to “ensure” a place for literature in “the modern world,” it is 
necessary to recognize Blithedale as a novel on the cusp of 
radical social transformation—as capturing the moment the 
antebellum era slides into the modern world and conceptions 
of American destiny such as an agrarian utopia envisaged 
by thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson fade away and assume 
the “inexpressibly dreary . . . dingy . . . atmosphere of 
city-smoke” that Coverdale eschews upon his departure 
for Blithedale from Boston (Hawthorne 45). Coverdale 
and Hawthorne share the fear of an encroaching modern 
world that subjugates meaningful artistic expression with 
cold industry, hence Blithedale’s obsession with exploring 
agents of resistance such as a pre-industrial mode of life and 
antebellum conceptions of sympathy.  
 In order to understand the sympathetic imagination, 
the capacity to imaginatively and creatively feel what 
another feels, as an antebellum construct influencing artistic 
practices of the day, it is essential to understand that for 
the antebellum era, sympathy was a distinct way of life, a 
certain way of looking at the world. Contrary to rationalism, 
sympathy elevated the human heart, trusted the emotions, 
and possessed an unshakable faith in the inherent goodness 
of human nature. Sympathy connected individuals to others 
through the heart, an emotional connectedness that creates 
a community of individuals who share intangible emotional 
bonds. Rather than viewing humanity as comprised of 
disparate, isolated individuals, each striving to conquer 
the other as Thomas Hobbes asserted, sympathy saw 
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emotion as the universal, underlying current that united 
all people in a positive, immutable bond, a positivism that 
gives rise to egalitarian aspirations such as empathy and 
equality as well as Coverdale’s creative modus operandi 
the sympathetic imagination. Moments of tears and pity, 
exemplified by Coverdale’s forgiving Hollingsworth at the 
end of Blithedale—“tears gushed into my eyes, and I forgave 
him” (166), symbolize the power of sympathetic connection 
and its ability to repair broken relationships and connect 
unlike people. Frank Christianson argues that sympathy 
was popular among reformers like Coverdale in the mid-
nineteenth century because it provided an alternative sense 
of social connection to typical social relations, which were 
becoming more and more tinged by industrialism, expanding 
markets, and commercialism, precisely the things about 
“modern” society the Blithedalers hoped to reform by their 
flight to the wilderness (247). 
 Furthermore, sympathy provided the intellectual 
paradigm that allowed antebellum artists and reformers 
to transcend prejudice and look towards creating a more 
pluralistic society.  At least in theory, by casting aside 
class privilege, reformers gained an emotional community, 
a family bond that transcended race, gender, and socio-
economic status. Sympathy understands human relations as 
the holy union between peoples; by imagining a universal, 
“ubiquitous experience” that underlies all human action, 
sympathy makes possible an expansive sense of family 
united through emotional connections (Castiglia 200). 
Sympathy, as dramatized in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel 
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Uncle Tom’s Cabin, allowed for white, middle-class women 
from the North to identify with Southern black slaves and 
their abjection; feeling the plight of slaves as similar to their 
own bondage to their families and homes, white women were 
incited to political action and social reform (Levine 225). 
Ideally, sympathetic identification imaginatively suspended 
the racial prejudices of the members of mainstream society 
and allowed them to establish an emotional bond with the 
marginalized “other” that held philanthropic and political 
underpinnings. 
 Blithedale represents many of these sentiments, 
especially the link between reformist aspirations, 
sympathetic emotions, and artistic creation. At one point 
in the novel, Zenobia thanks Coverdale for his “beautiful 
poetry,” to which he replies: “I hope now…to produce 
something that shall really deserve to be called poetry—
true, strong, natural, and sweet, as in the life which we 
are about to lead” (12-13).  In the furtherance of that goal, 
Coverdale soon finds his creative sympathies engaged by 
the “pitiableness” of Priscilla’s “depressed and sad…figure,” 
the result of her working in a factory.  He desires to commit 
her “poetical” frailty to verse (21). Set against the surging 
tide of the Industrial Revolution, Blithedale, the communal 
farm, offers an alternative to the mode of life (and labor 
and creativity) that has been created by industrialism and 
market capitalism. Blithedale carves out a pre-industrial 
enclave in nature where reformers can step back in time and 
attempt to reverse, or at least critique and refine, the impact 
of industrialism on modern society. Blithedale’s liminal 
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occupation of a place and time between pre-industrial and 
industrial societies creates a kind of last bastion for the artist 
of the sympathetic imagination. 
 The aesthetic dimension of Coverdale’s sympathetic 
imagination is well illustrated in the scene in which Old 
Moodie visits Blithedale and inquires about Priscilla’s 
whereabouts and well-being, and here readers begin to see 
problematic aspects in Romanticism’s ideals. As Coverdale 
and Hollingsworth eat lunch after “hoeing potatoes, that 
forenoon,” Coverdale spots the degenerated form of an 
unexpected visitor, Old Moodie, “skulk[ing] along the edge 
of the field” (60). Coverdale instantly takes to describing Old 
Moodie’s dilapidated exterior: he is a “shabbily” dressed, 
“subdued, undemonstrative old man,” whose “red nose” 
indicates his penchant for consuming “a glass of liquor, now 
and then, and probably more than was good for him.” His 
“shy look about him, as if he were ashamed of his poverty,” 
causes Coverdale to recall his previous encounters with the 
unfortunate Old Moodie: “‘He haunts restaurants and such 
places, and has an odd way of lurking in corners . . . and 
holding out his hand, with some little article in it, which 
he wishes you to buy.’” Despite his poverty, Old Moodie 
remains a harmless person, and even a “tolerably honest 
one,” in Coverdale’s eyes. In the end, Old Moodie resembles 
a “furtive” rat, a harmless creature “without the mischief, the 
fierce eye, the teeth to bite with, or the desire to bite” (60).
  Old Moodie’s pathetic figure is noteworthy because 
it arouses in Coverdale the powerful sympathetic emotions 
that inspire both his call to reform and his imaginative 
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leaps into the interior life of the subject. Old Moodie’s 
weakness (“a very forlorn old man”) renders him vulnerable 
to Coverdale’s “custom” of “making . . . prey of people’s 
individualities,” or his sympathetic imagination: “I tried to 
identify my mind with the old fellow’s, and take his view 
of the world, as if looking through a smoke-blackened glass 
as the sun” (61). Coverdale then beholds the following 
“through old Moodie’s eyes”:
those pleasantly swelling slopes of our farm, 
descending towards the wide meadows, through 
which sluggishly circled the brimful tide of the 
Charles, bathing the long sedges on its hither and 
farther shores; the broad, sunny gleam over the 
winding water . . . the sultry heat-vapor, which 
rose everywhere like incense, and in which my 
soul delighted, as indicating so rich a fervor in the 
passionate day, and in the earth that was burning 
with its love.” (61)
In his mind, Coverdale derives creative power not through 
his volition, imagination, or internal well of emotional 
wealth but by looking “through old Moodie’s eyes.” He takes 
the plight of Old Moodie, a victim of modernity, and turns 
forlornness into a beautiful vista. His encounter with Old 
Moodie shows that Coverdale’s sympathetic imagination 
creates powerful imagery, elegant prose, and unique insights 
into the human condition. This aesthetic program, however, 
subjugates the “other” and achieves creative bursts through 
the appropriation of Old Moodie’s abjection. 
 While Coverdale fears the changes wrought by 
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industrialism and uses Blithedale and the sympathetic 
imagination as a romantic escape into a pastoral way of 
life, Hollingsworth embraces modernity for the possibilities 
it creates for the reformation and subsequent perfection 
of man, as seen in his prison-reform project. With his 
constant attention to work and to his philanthropic dream, 
the construction of his “visionary edifice” dedicated to the 
“reform and mental culture of our criminal brethren” through 
“methods moral, intellectual, and industrial” (Hawthorne 
41, 91 emphasis added), Hollingsworth is emblematic of 
what Paul Faler terms “industrial morality.” In his “Cultural 
Aspects of the Industrial Revolution: Lynn, Massachusetts, 
Shoemakers and Industrial Morality, 1826-1860,” Faler 
provides insight into how Hawthorne participates in the 
antebellum discourse on labor and how relevant the concept 
of industrial morality is to understanding Blithedale and 
Hawthorne’s need to reconsider his aesthetic conceptions. 
Taking Lynn, Massachusetts as a microcosm of the Industrial 
Revolution in mid-nineteenth century America, Faler 
explores the cultural and social changes that occurred in 
a New England town as a result of industrialism and the 
imposition of industrial morality. Industrial morality, simply 
put, was the cultural expression of the Industrial Revolution; 
it was, according to Faler, “a new morality based upon the 
paramount importance of work,” linking useful productivity 
with human worth (220). It enjoined the individual to take 
up strict inner discipline, “a tightening up of the moral 
code,” that sought to abolish, alter, or sublimate the culture 
of leisure or “those customs, traditions and practices that 
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interfered with productive labor” (220). 
 Bruce Laurie goes further to describe the 
proselytizing element of industrial morality, whose mission 
was to dismantle the culture of leisure, the “culture of sport, 
merrymaking, and drinking,” that characterized preindustrial 
labor (218). By regarding leisure, and preindustrial culture 
by extension, as “wasteful, frivolous and, above all, sinful,” 
industrialization based its new morality on regimentation, 
uniformity, and efficiency of production, a move that 
moralized economics and made the workplace the root of 
daily life and modern society (Laurie 219). Civil society 
played a crucial role in this process; philanthropists and 
reformers formed community groups that became the 
“cultural apparatus of ideas and institutions” that instilled 
the new values of industry (220). For example, in Lynn, 
reformers banded together in The Society for the Promotion 
of Industry, Frugality, and Temperance to promote the 
following values:
self-discipline, emphasis on productive labor, and 
condemnation of wasteful habits. Industry, frugality 
and temperance, if conscientiously followed, would 
result in savings that would bring material reward 
to the wage earner and wellbeing to the community. 
(Faler 220)
Industrial morality attempted to replace the community of 
feeling, of sympathetic emotions and invisible bonds, with 
a community of materialism. Rather than resist the tide of 
industrialism as Blithedale attempts to do, civil society—
reformers and philanthropists—in Lynn played an integral 
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role in the promulgation of industrialism.  
 In this way, Hawthorne’s reformer-philanthropist 
Hollingsworth resembles the moralists of Lynn more 
than Blithedale’s idealists. Industrial morality manifests 
itself in Hollingsworth’s inner character as the earnest, 
singular attention with which he attempts to consummate 
“his philanthropic dream” and in his recurring attempts 
to make converts to his cause. Coverdale hints at the 
duplicitous undertone and perhaps ulterior motive behind 
Hollingsworth’s presence on the first night at Blithedale: “his 
heart . . . was never really interested in our socialist scheme, 
but was forever busy with his strange and . . . impracticable 
plan for the reformation of criminals, through an appeal to 
their higher instincts” (27). Coverdale aptly perceives an 
aberration of character in Hollingsworth when he reflects 
that Hollingsworth had joined Blithedale “actuated by no 
real sympathy with our feelings and our hopes,” but because 
he had alienated himself “from the world” in his pursuit of 
his “lonely and exclusive object” (40). In Coverdale’s eyes, 
Hollingsworth’s alienation from the world, due to his pursuit, 
has rendered him as “not altogether human”:
There was something else in Hollingsworth, besides 
flesh and blood, and sympathies and affections, 
and celestial spirit. This is always true of those 
men who have surrendered themselves to an over-
ruling purpose. It does not so much impel them 
from without, nor even operate as a motive power 
within…and finally converts them into little else 
save that one principle. (Hawthorne 51)
11
Undergirding the passion and zeal by which Hollingsworth 
submits to this “over-ruling purpose” and strives towards 
nothing else “save for that one principle” is his emphasis 
on industrial morality, “the earnest and constant attention to 
work” (Faler 220). 
 That reference to “something else in Hollingsworth” 
that is neither “flesh,” sympathy, or spirit alludes to a prior 
conversation between Coverdale and Hollingsworth where 
the latter proclaims, “I have always been in earnest . . . I 
have hammered thought out of iron, after heating the iron 
in my heart!  Were I a slave, at the bottom of a mine, I 
should keep the same purpose, the same faith in its ultimate 
accomplishment, that I do now” (49). While asserting that 
Coverdale is not in earnest, “either as a poet or a laborer” 
(49), Hollingsworth characterizes himself as an earnest 
slave, Sisyphean in his interminable labor, trapped within 
the iron furnace of his own subsumed, industrial heart. 
Furthermore, like a machine, Hollingsworth will always 
press on in his mission, destroying those sympathetic 
individuals “who should be drawn into too intimate a 
connection with him” because he possesses, in Coverdale’s 
words, “no heart, no sympathy, no reason, no conscience” 
(51). Through “faith” in the earnest attention to “the same 
purpose,” Hollingsworth’s labor will come to fruition and his 
philanthropic vision will be realized. The passage is nothing 
less than Hollingsworth’s articulation of his own personal 
industrial morality—the means by which he will achieve his 
dream—and a condemnation of Coverdale’s frivolous ways. 
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 The conflict between the aesthetics of sympathy 
and the ideology of labor industry culminates during 
Hollingsworth’s final attempt to convert Coverdale to 
his cause. In response to Coverdale’s revelry over the 
“romantic story” their labor at Blithedale will make for their 
progeny, Hollingsworth says, “Listen to me, Coverdale. 
Your fantastic anticipations make me discern . . . what 
a wretched, unsubstantial scheme is this. . . I ask you to 
be, at last, a man of sobriety and earnestness, and aid me 
in an enterprise which is worth all our strength, and the 
strength of a thousand mightier than we!” (91). The higher 
“purpose in life, worthy of the most extreme self-devotion,” 
that Hollingsworth offers to Coverdale reflects industrial 
morality’s proselytizing mission to replace the cultures, 
ethics, and ideologies it deems inferior and wasteful, such 
as Coverdale’s life of “aimless beauty,” his embrace of 
sympathy (93). Hollingsworth’s deep desire, bordering on 
religious destiny, to promulgate his morality is well alluded 
to in his comparison with the “venerable apostle Eliot,” a 
comparison that links his “Indian auditory” with Coverdale, 
Priscilla, Zenobia, and the criminals he hopes to correct and 
edify through “methods moral, intellectual, and industrial” 
(83, 91). While Coverdale is able to resist Hollingsworth’s 
Faustian bargain with an emphatic negative, his denial 
underscores Hollingsworth’s criticism that Coverdale is 
neither a poet nor laborer and that his call to poetry and to 
reform—sympathy—lacks inner conviction.
 Hawthorne stages the contest between sympathy 
and industry to consider the validity of his own calling: how 
useful is the poet in industrial society? Would industrialists, 
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like Hollingsworth, who “never had the slightest 
appreciation of [Coverdale’s] poetry,” (49) regard poetry, if 
not art in general, as “frivolous” or even “sinful”? What are 
we to make of Coverdale’s abandonment of poetry at the end 
of the novel if not that it was a dying art, displaced by the 
machine? The antebellum discourse on labor and its cultural 
productions, such as industrial morality, posed a mortal 
threat to Hawthorne’s creative calling. As such, Blithedale 
grapples with the forces of change and their conflict with 
convention. Hawthorne’s desire to abstract himself out of his 
present situation through romantic invention belies his active 
engagement with the modern world. Hawthorne questions 
sympathy’s ability truly to understand the “other” while 
simultaneously trying to inhabit the lives of his characters. 
With its new standards of ascertaining value, The Blithedale 
Romance speaks to Hawthorne’s fear of industry’s iron 
hammer as the death knell for poetry. In the final analysis, 
rather than identify, as the novel’s treatment of sympathy 
would have us do, with Coverdale’s retired life of quiet 
complacency or Hollingsworth’s shattered heart, Hawthorne 
asks us to look beyond contemporary obstructions and to 
affirm art and poetry’s place in modern society. 
14
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t is no wonder that Henry Purcell and John Dryden 
came together for King Arthur. The baffling clutch 
of 60 notation manuscripts and the missing libretto mean 
that the origins and intricacies of the collaboration remain 
elusive (Winn 33), but it is clear from what we do possess 
that Purcell’s music and Dryden’s words synthesised with 
marked artistic cohesion. Indeed, the language of Dryden’s 
odes and satires is consistently inflected with a composer’s 
I
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sensitivity to orchestration, whereby sound and syntax weave 
together like instrumental timbres. Although some lucid 
comparisons between Dryden and composers contemporary 
to his time can be found in the wealth of criticism on his 
work, this essay deliberately merges technical musicianship 
and verse, providing a rare perspective on Dryden’s poetry.
 Where better to begin any exploration of this topic 
than “An Ode, On The Death of Henry Purcell,” in which 
Dryden turns composer in imitation of his subject. The 
music of Dryden’s verse is the kind that emerges from finely 
tuned close reading that we come to by using our ears as 
much as our eyes. The first stanza is baroque chamber music 
incarnate, the details of which shall be laid out quickly for 
the sake of brevity, but with an attempt at accuracy and 
wholeness: 
         I
Mark how the Lark and Linnet Sing, 
 With rival Notes 
They strain their warbling Throats, 
 To welcome in the Spring. 
 But in the close of Night, 
When Philomel begins her Heav’nly lay, 
 They cease their mutual spite, 
Drink in her Music with delight, 
And list’ning and silent, and silent and list’ning, 
 And list’ning and silent obey.
19
We are tuned into the work with an imperative: “Mark.” 
This arresting tonic is then tied to “Lark,” which begins 
an ornithological strain carrying through alliteratively into 
“Linnet.” The verb “Sing” calls backwards—by virtue of 
also being a verb—to “Mark,” and before we know it, we 
have something that resembles a periodic, melodic subject, 
“in the key of birds,” perhaps. As is typical of baroque 
chamber music, evidenced in Corelli’s violin sonatas and 
Telemann’s Paris quartets, or perhaps more relevantly in 
Purcell’s viol fantasias, the subject is then meticulously 
unraveled outwards across the rest of the stanza, while 
being inflected with various twists of intonation; however, it 
strictly maintains itself as a conceptual development of the 
opening material (this was later taken to its farthest extreme 
in eighteenth-century piano sonatas, typified by Mozart). As 
these birds turn the verb “sing” into “strain” (phonologically 
close yet conceptually in friction), they locate themselves in 
“Spring” and lose their “Spite.” The ‘s’ sounds concatenate 
throughout the stanza and bring about a sonic unity between 
the birds, the season, and their mood. To accompany this, as 
a kind of counter-melody, ‘w’ sounds on “with,” “welcome,” 
and “when” synchronize alongside the main narrative 
‘s’-sound arc and set up a kind of linguistic counterpoint, 
whereby ‘w’ and ‘s’ flit between one another to mimic the 
trilling melodies of the singing birds. As though the complex 
texture of musical imitation was not technical enough by 
now, the final two lines become transcendent of necessarily 
monophonic verse and branch into harmony: the retrograde 
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repetitions of “list’ning and silent” set up a pattern identical 
to a cycle of fifths—a little twist on the common chiasmus. 
This harmonic technique works by making dominant chords 
repeatedly jump to one another underneath the main melody, 
which not only creates a plangent, stable base from which 
the ornamentation can spring but also gives baroque music 
its color, its overall tonality. Silence and listening, of course, 
are integral to an ode in precisely the same way that the cycle 
of fifths is the harmonic bedrock of baroque counterpoint. 
The final swish, which links all of these intricacies together, 
is the plan of the stanza, whereby the ornamental trills and 
subjects occur at the top (opening lines), the developments 
and counter-melodies in the center, and the verbal cycle-of-
fifths at the bottom, which directly replicates both the setup 
of sheet music and the roles each instrument would play 
on the page. It is a masterpiece of musical imitation, if one 
unpicks the initially deadening tones of lament. 
 It seems, then, that it is possible to read Dryden 
in this way. A deliberately experimental close reading, as 
above, where the intricacies of musical composition are 
sought in a Pindaric ode, seems to work. But the imitative 
delicacies of finely tuned language, as exhibited in the 
Purcell stanza, are everywhere in Dryden’s oeuvre, and 
potently draw out the life of his subject matter. As put by 
Earl Miner in Dryden’s Poetry, the musical quality of the 
verse is “rather an intellectual articulation of feeling than 
an emotional development of ideas” (231). This seems 
right, landing squarely on the way in which Dryden’s verse 
can feel both stale and enlivened at once, especially to 
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postmodern audiences unaccustomed to the formal rigor of 
Augustan verse. To this section of “An Evening’s Love,” 
in which the fuzziness of experience is figured through 
exquisite ambiguities of sound:
                      When, with a sigh, she accords me the blessing, 
                    And her eyes twinkle ‘twixt pleasure and pain, 
                       Ah, what a joy ‘t is, beyond all expressing, 
                   Ah what a joy to hear: “Shall we again?”
            (13-16)
Of course, the ecstatic sensuousness of the repeated “ah” 
sound is prominent. Not only does this abstract syllable 
begin two adjacent lines, but it emerges from the end of 
innocuous words like “hear” and “pleasure” upon re-reading: 
the half-aspirated, half-growled openness of this syllable 
is both mimetic of mid-coital enthusiasm and post-coital 
release.  Dryden is having some fun here. Once the “ah” 
is heard, it cannot be unheard in open-ended words like 
“hear” and “pleasure,” which take on a palpable sexual 
quality where it once existed in mere semantics. But this is 
not all: there is something strangely both sharp and blunt in 
the prefix “tw,” which quickly prods akimbo with “twinkle 
‘twixt.” It stabs, but with a cork. It jabs but it doesn’t hurt. 
We are, as in the verse itself, “’twixt pleasure and pain.” 
This kind of awkward paradox also exists in the repetition 
of “what a joy,” which questions itself by assertion one time 
too many. The repetition brings about a strange musical 
hook of monotony, of things being oddly familiar, of being 
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overly assertive and unable truly to give way to ecstatic 
lyricism. Dryden’s soundscape of sexual experience then 
neatly captures a kind of delusional optimism, where the 
constantly affirmative presentation of “joy” and “pleasure” 
is tarred with “pain” and plangent repetition. This is what 
Miner means by an “intellectual articulation of feeling”: this 
clamping of experience into highly wrought verse on the 
one hand deadens the vitality of lived experience, but on the 
other allows a patterned ekphrasis to occur from within this 
strict framework. 
 The heroic couplet, however, is occasionally 
broken to allow a more “emotional development of ideas.” 
Christopher Ricks draws our attention to Dryden’s triplets 
as being form-defying and of exceptional merit. The thesis 
of his article is that Dryden’s triplets are not only “little 
intended to,” but carry a wealth of meaning in their breaking 
of the heroic couplet—primarily by the virtue of being 
bond-breaking. His systematic working through of the seven 
triplets in “Absalom and Architophel” (with occasional 
glance at “The Hind and The Panther”) leads him to the 
following conclusion: the triplet “resists or tempers the 
despotism of the couplet” and it has a “particular finality 
of emphasis.” Of course, Ricks’ way of reading Dryden’s 
triplets is pertinent and illuminating, but the musical essence 
of the triplet could be pushed a lot further. In chamber 
music, for example, one searches in vain through Purcell’s 
viol fantasias without a single authentic triplet. Similarly, 
in Corelli’s violin sonatas, they simply do not exist. The 
baroque composer seems to have considered compound time 
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to be the way into triplets, and their only rightful place. With 
no surprise, then, the search becomes abundantly successful 
when we turn to something like Corelli’s Trio Sonata in D 
Major, Op.3 no.2 (the Allegro), which by virtue of being 
in compound time (6/8) is a sea of triplets. But is there any 
crossover, as with the injection of triplets into “Absalom and 
Architophel”? Cue Purcell’s famous Abdelazer Overture, 
where triplets are whispering their influence in the main 
melody of the second subject. After the stately climb of 
the first subject, the second exhibits a falling sequence that 
bounces between crotchets and pairs of quavers: 
 
Look at that first violin.  Purcell employs triplet groups 
about as often as Dryden—that is, hardly ever—but when 
they do occur, they irreversibly change the essence of the 
music. In this section of the Abdelazer Rondeau, the string 
voices are consistently “iambic”: that is, straight-laced, 
only crotchets and quavers and the occasional minim. The 
regular denominations and groupings of notes bring about 
this stilted and corseted temperament, which create, like 
Dryden’s highly wrought heroic couplets, a system of intense 
formality from which the energy can emerge. When we enter 
the more whimsical second subject (pictured), however, the 
groups of crotchets and quavers find themselves triplet-ing 
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up and creating that gigue-like skip we know about from 
compound time. It is like a processing regiment of soldiers 
that suddenly decide to hop, skip, and jump: the illusion 
of triplets begins to lift the mood into something quirkily 
bright. 
 This precise technique, of superimposing compound-
time triplets onto ostensibly common time, sounds-off the 
opening to Dryden’s “To the Memory of Mr. Oldham”: 
Farewell, too little and too lately known,
Whom I began to think and call my own, 
For sure our souls were near allied, and thine
Cast in the same poetic mould with mine. 
In the first two lines, we have a tripartite configuration of 
“too,” where the third part is “to.” Just like a crotchet and 
two quavers, perhaps? Moreover, the alliteration on ‘s’ 
occurs three times with “sure,” “souls,” and “same,” which 
is also a crotchet and two quavers of ‘sh’ and ‘s’, ‘s.’ Further 
spread out, “farewell” (with the stress on ‘w’), “whom,” 
and “were” is another crotchet and two quavers of ‘h’ 
and ‘w’, ‘w.’ The essential beauty of these three (!) triplet 
configurations? They are almost entirely unstressed, with the 
exception of the “well” in ‘farewell,” which we suppose has 
to be stressed because it is the opening exclamation. Here 
Dryden presents a delicate and complex imitation of that 
identified Purcellian technique of slotting triplet groups into 
common time; in doing so on (almost) entirely unstressed 
syllables, he allows it to guide the meanderings of the 
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verse without taking over as the overbearing feature. The 
exceptionally rich detail of these first four lines, musically 
speaking, is in friction with the almost coyly simple conceit, 
in which Oldham is not quite a Dryden, but a lamentably 
worthy heir to the Dryden throne. The technical complexity 
continues: to assess the number three in this poem could be 
an endless spiral of observation.  The three primary tenses 
are used to set up the lineage of great poetry; there is a real 
“Ricks-ian” triplet late on that imitates the idea of “generous 
fruits” and “maturing time” by transcending formality and 
expectation; and alliterating sounds seem always to be in a 
crotchet/two-quaver trinity, in some way or other (“poetic,” 
“cast,” “common”; “slippery,” “race,” “ripe”). But though 
this can go on (seemingly) forever, it is the sonic quality 
of the triplet that truly cements our impression of Dryden’s 
verse, which unifies the weft of the meter in a way that is 
manifestly life-giving. In which case, even though Ricks 
picked up on an endlessly fertile subject in Dryden’s triplets, 
he did not make quite the fullest of its musical implications 
that he could. When we look at a music composer’s use 
of triplets, as with Purcell’s famous Abdelazer Rondeau, 
we can see that the baroque conception of the tripartite 
microstructure was felt more deeply than just “three lines 
together,” more deeply than just “compound time.” It seems 
that the musicality of triples extends into being a unifying 
feature of melody and rhythm where the restrictions of the 
form should not strictly allow so. Dryden loved this. 
 Thus, a musical reading of Dryden reveals several 
nuances of his verse that evidence an eccentric but sensitive 
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poetic wit. Whether he is imitating the graphics of sheet 
music in the first stanza of the Purcell ode, complicating pure 
ekphrasis in “An Evening’s Love” and mimicking difficult 
emotional ambiguity, or having a distinctly Purcellian swing 
at fusing musical modes and phrasing, he is always in tune 
with how form and language can be instrumental as musical 
aids to his grander scheme of meaning. As a final blazon of 
musicality, consider the last line of the ode on Purcell, which 
is entirely built with monosyllabic, resonant, dark vowel 
sounds like a last chord on the organ, Purcell’s instrument 
and the site of his final resting place:
 
 The gods are pleased alone with Purcell’s lays, 
 Nor know to mend their choice.
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Hysteria and the Performance of Masculinity: 




ne of the most significant contributions of structuralist 
linguistic theory to contemporary feminist literary 
theory has been the formulation of binary oppositions. First 
articulated by Ferdinand de Saussure in his posthumously 
published 1916 work Course in General Linguistics, binary 
oppositions are a part of the inherent structure of language 
which defines words by their opposites. In a binary system, 
dark is defined as not-light, black is defined as not-white, 
and bad is defined as not-good. These terms occupy a place 
of either privilege or disfavor based on their position within 
O
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the binary. In the previous example, light is privileged over 
dark, white is privileged over black, and good is privileged 
over bad. Later structuralist theorists such as Claude Lévi-
Strauss applied Saussure’s definition of linguistic binaries to 
societies and systems of thought. Because all human thought 
is mediated by language, this same binary logic is one of 
the structures by which people understand the world. The 
fundamental binary of feminist theory is the binary between 
masculine and feminine. Implicit in each gender binary 
are secondary binaries: masculinity as rational, femininity 
as irrational; masculinity as non-emotional, femininity as 
over-emotional. In each of these gender binaries, the male, 
rational, and non-emotional are clearly privileged. 
The disfavored status of the feminine as irrational 
and over-emotional in this gender binary leads to the 
conception of the feminine as hysterical. The root of the 
word “hysteria” comes from the Greek word “hystera,” 
meaning “uterus.” The Greeks believed that hysteria was 
an emotional condition peculiar to women, caused by 
menstrual cycles. In English usage, “hysteria” is a state of 
excess or uncontrollable emotion that has become part of the 
Western paradigmatic description of femininity. As it relates 
to femininity, hysteria not only casts the feminine as over-
emotional but also renders women incapable of controlling 
emotion and therefore irrational.
James Joyce’s story “A Painful Case” from his 1914 
short story collection Dubliners describes a friendship and 
potential romantic relationship between two characters—Mr. 
James Duffy and Mrs. Emily Sinico—that is abruptly ruined 
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by hysteria. Mr. Duffy, an ostensibly masculine bank teller, 
fears hysteria as a feminine emotional force that threatens 
to undermine his masculinity. As a result, when Mrs. Sinico 
attempts physical and emotional intimacy with Mr. Duffy 
by pressing his hand to her cheek, he interprets her behavior 
as hysterical and impulsively breaks off their relationship. 
However, upon reading the news of Mrs. Sinico’s tragic 
death four years later, Mr. Duffy reacts with extreme and 
uncontrollable emotional upheaval and irrationality. Through 
his compulsive fear of hysteria, Mr. Duffy ironically 
reveals himself to be emotionally hysterical, undermining 
his performance of masculinity and deconstructing the 
gendering of hysteria itself.
Mr. Duffy’s performance of masculinity depends on 
his ability not to exhibit hysteria. Instead, Mr. Duffy counters 
any emotional impulse that threatens to become hysteric 
by retreating to hyper-rationality. As a result, Mr. Duffy’s 
gendered identity is built around a negation: not-hysteria. 
Based upon Judith Butler’s claim that gender is not an 
essential identity but “an identity instituted through a stylized 
repetition of acts” (900, emphasis Butler’s), Mr. Duffy 
performs his gender through his rejecting hysteria. Mr. Duffy 
is able to perform not-hysteria by reversing each of its terms: 
if hysteria is overly emotional and irrational, not-hysteria 
must be non-emotional and hyper-rational. This performance 
of not-hysteria composes Mr. Duffy’s masculinity. Mr. 
Duffy’s gender identity becomes what Butler describes as 
“a performative accomplishment which the mundane social 
audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe 
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and to perform in the mode of belief” (901). Because Mr. 
Duffy believes in his own performance, he is not conscious 
of his own fear of hysteria. 
Mr. Duffy reacts to his fear of hysteria with a 
compulsive need to emphasize his own rationality and 
masculinity. Joyce’s initial description of Mr. Duffy offers 
an insight into the character’s unsuccessful masculine 
performance and amorphously gendered nature. Mr. Duffy’s 
house is described as “somber,” his floors are “uncarpeted” 
and his walls are “free from pictures” (317). “Black” and 
“iron”—dual signifiers for masculinity—appear again and 
again in Mr. Duffy’s furnishings: “black iron bedstead,” 
“iron washstand,” “a fender and irons,” and “a black and 
scarlet rug” (317). Each black item in the room, however, is 
matched by an opposing white item, reflecting Mr. Duffy’s 
conflicting impulses. Mr. Duffy’s bookcase is made of 
“white wood,” his bed is covered in “white bedclothes,” 
and a “white-shaded lamp” is the “sole ornament of [his] 
mantelpiece” (317). Looking around the room at the 
furniture that “[h]e had himself bought” (317), Mr. Duffy’s 
outlook on life is literally black and white. He views 
life through the stark binary oppositions of rationality/
irrationality and stoicism/hysteria. Anything that he classifies 
as “black“ becomes privileged as masculine—traditional 
bedstead, utilitarian washstand, practical fender and irons, 
and pointedly functional rug—while anything that he 
classifies as “white” becomes associated with femininity 
and dreaded hysteria—decorative bookcase shelves, soft 
bedclothes, and a condemningly ornamental lamp.  However, 
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the presence of both black and white objects in the physical 
space of his room exposes Mr. Duffy’s flawed gender 
performance and reveals him to be equally rational and 
irrational, stoic and hysterical, and, by the extension of his 
gendered logic, both masculine and feminine.   Mr. Duffy 
strives so hard to remove himself from emotion and the 
threat of hysteria that he even separates his rationality from 
his physicality, “liv[ing] at a little distance from his body” 
while simultaneously “regarding his own acts with doubtful 
side-glances” (318). His habit of composing sentences about 
himself in the third person and in the past tense reflects his 
separation of mind from body as well as the classical binary 
that privileges writing over speech (318). Because Mr. 
Duffy’s performance of masculinity depends on his ability 
to perform rationality, the threat of hysteria—that deadly 
combination of emotion and irrationality—is the threat to 
undermine his performance of masculinity. As a result, Mr. 
Duffy is particularly vulnerable to intrusive emotion because 
to risk performing hysteria is to completely dismantle his 
gendered identity.
Mr. Duffy exploits his relationship with Mrs. 
Sinico as an opportunity to prove his own performance of 
masculinity to himself. In this role, Mr. Duffy only views 
Mrs. Sinico as an audience or background for his own 
egocentric performances. Judith Butler uses the metaphor 
of theatre to explain the way gender is performed in her 
essay “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution.” She 
compares gender to a role that an actor plays rather than 
any essential quality of the actor (906). Expanding on this 
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metaphor, Mr. Duffy’s performance of masculinity cannot be 
real unless he has an audience. In his relationship to Emily 
Sinico, Mr. Duffy finds that audience. However, Mr. Duffy’s 
relationship to Mrs. Sinico is inherently dangerous: as a 
feminine audience she has the ability to affirm Mr. Duffy’s 
performance of masculinity but as a potentially hysterical 
woman she also has the ability to radically undermine that 
performance. 
Mr. Duffy’s first meeting with Mrs. Sinico outlines 
his relationship with her as performative for the rest of the 
story. He consistently relates to her in an intellectualized, 
dispassionate way while she repeatedly attempts to relate to 
him in more intimate, personal ways. Consistent with Mr. 
Duffy’s emotional and relational detachment, Mrs. Sinico is 
the one who initiates their relationship. In the only instance 
of direct address in the story, Mrs. Sinico—at a concert that 
both she and Mr. Duffy happen to be attending—observes: 
“What a pity there is such a poor house tonight! It’s so 
hard on people to have to sing to empty benches” (319). 
Unfortunately, Emily Sinico has unknowingly predicted 
her own role within the story. Mr. Duffy, as a man defined 
by his furniture, is immediately associated with empty 
benches. This self-described “outcast from life’s feast” (325) 
is emotionally and relationally empty just like the benches 
and the furniture that he buys. Mrs. Sinico, in contrast, is 
immediately associated with the singer. Her love of music 
causes her to come into contact with Mr. Duffy and she 
continues to be connected to music—at least in Mr. Duffy’s 
mind—for the rest of the story. After Mr. Duffy ends his 
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relationship with Mrs. Sinico, he “[keeps] away from 
concerts lest he should meet her” (321), firmly linking her 
with musicality and the performance of music. Mr. Duffy’s 
initial “liking for Mozart’s music” which “brought him 
sometimes to an opera or a concert” (318) at the beginning 
of the story indicates emotional sympathies which Emily 
Sinico later comes to represent. Indeed, Mr. Duffy’s habit of 
attending concerts is described as “the only dissipations of 
his life” (318) and the only detail of his description which 
hints toward Mr. Duffy’s emotional vulnerabilities. 
In contrast, Mr. Duffy first relates to Mrs. Sinico by 
analytically assessing her like a new furniture purchase. He 
appraises her based on the dual criterion of feminine beauty 
and sex appeal and masculine rationality—demanding that 
she perform both masculine and feminine gender roles at the 
same time. He finds Mrs. Sinico to possess a “temperament 
of great sensibility” and a face that exhibits “intelligence” 
(319). Mr. Duffy’s later pseudo-philosophical reflection that 
“[l]ove between man and man is impossible because there 
must not be sexual intercourse and friendship between man 
and woman is impossible because there must be sexual 
intercourse” (321) manifests his expectation that a true 
companion should be able to perform multiple genders 
at once. However, contradicting this expectation, he also 
evaluates her in explicitly sexual terms, confining her to 
the performance of femininity. He immediately deduces 
her age as “a year or so younger than himself”—making 
her a possible sexual partner— while imperiously deciding 
that her face “must have been handsome,” and casually 
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noting that her “bosom [is] of a certain fullness” (319). 
Mr. Duffy expects Mrs. Sinico to perform multiple genders 
simultaneously in order to balance his need for emotional 
validation with his fear of emotional hysteria and retreat into 
hyper-rationality.
Throughout the story, Mrs. Sinico successfully 
performs gender multiplicity and healthy relational 
capacities while Mr. Duffy performs gender stagnation and 
an anesthetized approach to relationships. Mrs. Sinico is 
successfully able to navigate both rationality and emotional 
competency while Mr. Duffy rejects all forms of emotional 
expression to protect his tenuously enacted performance of 
hyper-rational masculinity. Mr. Duffy is able to relate to Mrs. 
Sinico only through rationality: he “share[s] his intellectual 
life with her” through “books” and “ideas” (319). Emily 
Sinico, in contrast, attempts to cultivate a more personal 
relationship with Mr. Duffy. “In return for his theories” 
she gives him “some fact of her life” which he is unable 
to appreciate or reciprocate (319-320). All of the verbs 
used to describe Mr. Duffy’s relationship to Mrs. Sinico 
are active: he “entangle[s] his thoughts with hers,” lends 
books, provides ideas, and shares “intellectual life” (319). 
Mrs. Sinico is only able to relate to Mr. Duffy with a single 
passive verb construction: “She listened to all” (319). In 
her passive state, Mrs. Sinico becomes an audience for Mr. 
Duffy’s gender performance.
Mr. Duffy’s relationship with Mrs. Sinico ends 
abruptly, however, as soon as Mrs. Sinico reaches through 
the stage curtain to intrude upon Mr. Duffy’s performance 
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of masculinity. Mrs. Sinico’s moment of action in which she 
grasps Mr. Duffy’s hand “passionately” (320) and presses 
it to her cheek is a transgressive breach of the separation 
between performer and audience that Mr. Duffy has so 
carefully maintained. This act of passion is everything 
that threatens Mr. Duffy’s masculinity—it is spontaneous, 
uncontrolled, emotional, and irrational. Mr. Duffy’s 
immediate reaction is panicked and instinctive. He cuts off 
contact with Mrs. Sinico sharply, refusing to visit her for a 
week and becoming disillusioned with their relationship. In 
contrast to his earlier insistence that he visit her at her home 
instead of meeting her outside in parks—citing a “distaste 
for underhand ways” (310), Mr. Duffy’s final arrangements 
involve an outdoor rendezvous “in a little cake shop near 
the Parkgate” (320). Here they formally break off their 
relationship and Mr. Duffy rejects all human contact as 
“a bond to sorrow” (321). Upon their final parting, Mrs. 
Sinico has an emotional reaction that Mr. Duffy interprets 
as hysteria. Walking toward the tram to leave, Mrs. Sinico 
begins “to tremble so violently that, fearing another collapse 
on her part, [Mr. Duffy] bade her good-by quickly and left 
her” (321). Symptomatic of their relationship, Mr. Duffy’s 
first instinct is not concerned with Mrs. Sinico’s health but 
with his own tenuous gender construction. In order to protect 
his emotional detachment from the threat of hysteria (which 
he apparently believes is more contagious than a common 
cold) Mr. Duffy flees all contact with Emily Sinico to retreat 
once again into his realm of rationality. 
By examining this reaction to hysteria and others, 
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it becomes clear that Mr. Duffy associates hysteria with 
sexuality. As a result, Mr. Duffy fears any and all sexual 
contact that may lead to hysteria. Mr. Duffy’s anxieties 
about sexual relationships and hysteria are reflected in Luce 
Irigaray’s categorization of women as Mother, Virgin, and 
Prostitute in her essay “Women on the Market.” Although 
Irigaray specifically defines these categories as relating to the 
value of women in the marketplace, they are usual divisions 
for understanding the way Mr. Duffy conceptualizes the roles 
of women. As a married woman and mother, Mrs. Sinico 
naturally falls into Irigaray’s category of Mother (809). 
For Irigaray, Mothers are excluded from exchange because 
they have already been claimed by their husbands (809). 
Irigaray’s Mother is both non-sexual and non-hysterical: 
“Their responsibility is to maintain the social order without 
intervening so as to change it” (807). As long as Mrs. Sinico 
remains in this limited role as Mother, her relationship to 
Mr. Duffy is non-threatening. However, as soon as Mrs. 
Sinico attempts to exercise sexuality outside of the bounds 
of marriage by catching Mr. Duffy’s hand to her cheek, Mr. 
Duffy automatically classifies her as a Prostitute and flees 
the threat of hysteria that a Prostitute represents. Irigaray’s 
Prostitute is characterized by “seductiveness” that exists 
“to arouse the consumer’s desire” (808). She is explicitly 
emotional and sexual: her role has been defined in such a 
way that she creates both emotional upheaval and sexual 
desire in men. Although sexuality is often associated with 
masculine gender roles, Mr. Duffy interprets sexuality as 
an inherent threat to his masculinity. Because Mr. Duffy’s 
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masculinity depends on rationality, the inherently emotional 
nature of sex makes it directly opposed to his masculinity.
Judith Butler describes gender performance as 
“a project which has cultural survival at its end” (903). 
Especially in the world of “A Painful Case,” gender is 
a performance with what Butler calls “clearly punitive 
consequences” (903). Read through Butler’s framework of 
gender performance as cultural survival, Mrs. Sinico’s death 
can be interpreted as a direct result of hysteria. Although 
she is technically killed when she is hit by a train while 
crossing the tracks as a railroad station, the newspaper article 
which reports her death lists the actual cause of death as 
“shock and a sudden failure of the heart’s action” (323). 
Based on centuries of faulty medical understanding that 
defined hysteria as a uniquely female medical complaint 
with symptoms including emotional shock and weakness 
of the heart, it is hard to read this description of death as 
anything other than hysterical. While specifically referring 
to a railroad track, the fact that Mrs. Sinico is killed while 
“attempting to cross the line” can be easily read as an 
attempt to cross gender lines (322). Mary Lowe-Evans 
observes that the details of Mrs. Sinico’s death “conjure 
an image of a diminished, Emma-like woman desperate to 
break through the boundaries (cross the lines) of a space 
(her own circumscribed life, perhaps)” (397). In this attempt 
Mrs. Sinico is struck down as punishment for attempting 
to perform gender qualities outside of her narrow role as 
Mother. It is this same act of “crossing the line” in her 
relationship with Mr. Duffy that causes him to label and 
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reject her as hysterical. Mrs. Sinico’s death by train is an 
indictment of her earlier injury caused by Mr. Duffy’s rebuff. 
Mr. Duffy and the Kingstown train play the same role in 
ending Emily Sinico’s life.
After reading the newspaper account detailing “The 
Painful Case” of Mrs. Sinico, Mr. Duffy has a hysterical 
reaction to the news of her death. Mirroring the emotional 
activity that Mr. Duffy interpreted as hysterical in Mrs. 
Sinico, Mr. Duffy spends the remainder of the story in a 
state of extreme emotional instability and irrationality. Mr. 
Duffy abandons his formerly restrained choice of words to 
unleash a flurry of exclamations and exaggerations: “What 
an end!” (323); “His soul’s companion!” (324); “Just God, 
what an end!” (324); “But that she could have sunk so 
low!” (324). His emotional state renders him completely 
unable to finish his dinner and he rushes home in order to 
compose himself (323). He then reacts vindictively against 
Emily Sinico, distorting and questioning his own supposedly 
rational memory of her to wonder if it could be possible 
that “he had deceived himself so utterly about her” (324). 
From this point, Mr. Duffy turns to alcohol to deal with his 
emotional disturbance. Unwittingly mirroring Mrs. Sinico’s 
reaction to the end of her relationship with Mr. Duffy four 
years earlier, Mr. Duffy goes to the nearest public-house 
and drinks whiskey punch alone. In the same park where 
he and Mrs. Sinico last saw each other, he imagines her 
presence in the darkness, feeling “her voice touch his ear” 
and “her hand touch his” (325). By the time Mr. Duffy is 
jealously bemoaning his fate in the silence of night, he has 
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succumbed to full emotional hysteria and has dismissed both 
his rationality and his performance of masculinity.
Mr. Duffy’s state of hysteria reveals his former 
performance of masculinity to be nothing other than a sham. 
This reading of the ending of “A Painful Case” reveals Mr. 
Duffy to be an essentially hysterical character who gives an 
unconvincing performance of hyper-rational masculinity. At 
the abrupt and emotional ending of his relationship with Mrs. 
Sinico, Mr. Duffy exhibits a hysterical reaction to the fear of 
hysteria. When confronted with any emotion that threatens to 
undermine his performance of masculinity, Mr. Duffy always 
chooses to flee. However, it is not emotional instability or 
his relationship with Mrs. Sinico that triggers hysteria in 
Mr. Duffy; it is his irrational fear of hysteria. Mr. Duffy’s 
insecurity about his performance of masculinity ironically 
prompts him to perform the hysteria he associates with 
femininity. Using deconstructive logic, the case of Mr. Duffy 
shows hysteria to be both unrelated to either masculinity or 
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The Sublime Experience:
Individual versus Collective Morality 




illiam Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! serves as 
the culmination of all of the themes and narrative 
methods used within the writer’s previous works. The novel 
is also one of the primary examples of his transition from 
just a Southern author to a great American author.  Indeed, 
while confronting moral issues concerning the history of 
the South and expanding them through cultural references 
and various characters’ subjective perspectives, Faulkner’s 
novel becomes universally applicable and forces readers 
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to question their own moral capacities. By presenting a 
multiplicity of individual perspectives as part of the saga 
of the American South, Faulkner’s novel emphasizes the 
tension between individual and collective morality and 
suggests that, by achieving the philosophical, sublime 
experience whose roots are in the Enlightenment, both the 
characters and the readers can reach a sense of universal, 
collective truth that is vital to their capacity for moral 
judgment. 
 By reinforcing a binary between the individual and 
the collective, Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! expresses the 
philosophical idea of the sublime as introduced by Immanuel 
Kant. In “Narrating the Sublime in Absalom, Absalom! 
and The Unvanquished,” Adam Jabbur explains that while 
there is no evidence that Faulkner ever read Kant’s theory 
of the sublime, these ideas were most likely passed down 
to him through modernist thought (9). Kant’s theory of the 
sublime (inspired by the revived eighteenth-century interest 
in the topic due to the discovery of Longinus’ ancient text 
on the sublime) asserts that within the two subliminal states, 
mathematical and dynamical, there is an awareness of the 
loftiness or grandness of an object within nature or artistic 
representation, which in turn leads us to feel a kind of 
inadequacy or fear from being overwhelmed by this object.  
However, we compensate for this inadequacy through our 
human faculties of reason and imagination, thus leading 
us to feel a sense of power and superiority as we reflect 
on our nature as moral beings. Jabbur explains that “the 
mind itself becomes sublime as the free play of reason and 
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imagination arouses our ‘supersensible’ faculty, allowing 
us to imagine something that does not exist in reality, and 
thus to show our superiority to it: the courage, morality, and 
freedom of the individual” (9). Applied to the debate over 
mimetic art, this concept of the sublime weaved its way 
into much of Romantic literature (for example, Coleridge’s 
reconciliation of opposites and Shelley’s claim about 
poetry’s moral function); and the concept of the sublime also 
had social implications because of its influence on political 
thought, specifically the social contract theorists, whose 
concepts framed the U.S. Constitution.  As they reach mental 
sublimity, individuals enter the realm of the collective, 
reflecting on the moral capacity of all humankind. Thus, the 
social contract’s contending issues of individual freedom 
versus collective responsibility reflect Kant’s notion of the 
sublime. 
 The sublime and its related ideas in social contract 
theory are relevant to the novel. Henry Sutpen’s moral 
destruction, for example, is accompanied by his prioritizing 
personal ambition over the collective good, something 
Faulkner seems to suggest is present within the history of the 
South itself. And yet Faulkner also suggests something else 
within Absalom as he engages with both individuality and 
collectivity: through the reading of many perspectives comes 
a certain universal truth seen in all humankind. For example, 
Faulkner himself explained this tension in Absalom, claiming 
that “no one individual can look at truth” (qtd. in Jabbur 
12). He further explained that “[i]t was, as you say, thirteen 
ways of looking at a blackbird.” But the truth comes out, that 
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when the reader has read all these thirteen ways of looking 
at a blackbird, the reader has his own fourteenth image of 
that blackbird, which I would like to think is the truth” (qtd. 
in Jabbur 13). This is also consistent with Kant’s notion 
that, while humans contain all the same cognitive abilities, 
when they exercise imagination and reason and come to use 
their “supersensible” faculty to arouse moral judgment, their 
sublime experience allows them to comprehend a universal 
rule common to all humanity. Furthermore, this universal is 
a “function of subjectivity,” thus making the “harmonious 
interplay” between individual freedom and communal 
agreement a necessary requirement for moral reasoning and, 
ultimately, the creation of meaning within life (Jabbur 12). 
In essence, one must experience the sublime to achieve a 
balance between these two contending forces, within both 
their understanding of artistic creations (in the novel’s 
case, narratives) and within their capacity to make moral 
determinations. 
 Indeed, this notion of the universal, sublime 
experience can help explain Sutpen’s moral destruction. For 
example, Faulkner describes the conditions surrounding 
Sutpen’s youth, saying that “where he lived the land 
belonged to anybody and everybody,” implying that before 
Sutpen’s transformation into an immoral, destructive 
individual, he lived in a happier community that exercised 
collective responsibility. However, all this changed when 
his father forces the family to move: as they travel on a road 
of “descent,” Faulkner writes about Sutpen’s uncertainty of 
time and the passing of seasons: “whether they overtook and 
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passed in slow succession the seasons as they descended 
or whether it was the descent itself that did it and they not 
progressing parallel in time but descending perpendicularly 
through temperature and climate” (182). By highlighting the 
notion of timelessness and repeating the word “descent,” 
Faulkner emphasizes the point at which Sutpen begins 
his moral destruction. Hence, whereas Sutpen’s youthful 
state where land belonged to “anybody and everybody” 
within a collective realm expresses the sublime condition 
of universal morality, his family’s “descent” after their 
relocation helps to illustrate the point at which Sutpen 
begins his individualization and descends into the state of 
immorality. His destructive prioritization of the individual 
over the collective is clearly evident later in the novel, 
as Sutpen arrives home after the Civil War and refuses to 
express emotional support for his family, thus sacrificing his 
daughter’s and other children’s needs in order to serve his 
own selfish interests. Interestingly enough, while Faulkner 
answered questions at a meeting of the English Club at the 
University of Virginia in 1957, he described the character of 
Sutpen: “He said, I’m going to be the one that lives in the big 
house, I’m going to establish a dynasty, I don’t care how, and 
he violated all the rules or decency and honor and pity and 
compassion, and the fates took revenge on him” (qtd. in Karl 
549). In other words, Faulkner points out the consequences 
of Sutpen’s selfish individualism and disregard for the 
collective good of his immediate family and the surrounding 
community of Jefferson. In essence, Faulkner foregrounds 
Sutpen’s immorality in order to emphasize the tension 
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between individual interests and collective responsibility 
when it comes to human moral capacity. 
 While the priority of individual interest over 
collective good dooms both Sutpen and his family, this 
thematic trend allows the story to serve as an example 
of the South, thus elevating the novel through a sense of 
sublime, universal applicability. As Frederick Karl explains, 
Sutpen’s character seemed to be the product of Faulkner’s 
own attempt at healing his personal problems of the past, 
thus serving as an aesthetically sublime experience that 
allowed Faulkner to exercise both reason and imagination 
to form his own personal truth and meaning that might be 
shared with readers. Yet more importantly, Karl points out 
that “Faulkner is exalting pride and yet demonstrating how 
destructive it can be; and he is revealing how that aspect of 
the South—and, by implication, the country—is destructive” 
(549). In other words, the beneficial but destructive nature 
of individual pride must be carefully balanced with a sense 
of collective responsibility, an equilibrium that Faulkner 
suggests that the South failed to achieve. Furthermore, 
by illustrating that Sutpen’s selfish individualism is a 
destructive force, Faulkner is also revealing how the selfish 
nature of the South led to self-destruction instead of a 
greater, common good. In fact, Jabbur explains that the 
people of Yoknapatawpha “ostracize Sutpen in part because 
his difference from the community reminds them, ironically, 
of themselves” (12). Just as the destruction of Sutpen is the 
result of his disregard for the community around him, so is 
the destruction of the South a result of its violation of the 
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larger morality of the “human family.”  By illustrating this 
moral tension and some of the destructive consequences, the 
novel itself achieves the sublime: it becomes a “fourteenth 
image,” a new “supersensible” faculty that unites both 
individual and collective interests in its universal, moral 
applicability. 
 In addition to his use of Sutpen to showcase 
the tension between individual interest and collective 
responsibility, Faulkner employs the characters of Quentin 
and Shreve to explore the sublime experience and the 
possibility of a universal morality. To begin with, according 
to Jabbur, Faulkner’s decision to exercise authority over 
the text by withholding facts (a notable characteristic in 
most of his work) teases the reader and deprives him or 
her from learning about the issues of race that lie central to 
the novel. However, by withholding information, Faulkner 
also encourages his readers to achieve their own sublime 
experience as they exercise their “supersensible” faculties 
and discover a “fourteenth image” of truth. In this regard, 
it is Shreve who ultimately achieves a sense of the sublime 
while Quentin fails. Throughout the last third of the novel, 
Shreve seems to exercise that same harmony between 
imagination and reason, particularly as he ultimately 
exercises the “supersensible” faculty to make a moral 
judgment concerning the issue of race. As Jabbur points 
out, however, it is Quentin who silences Shreve just as he is 
about to tackle the topic of miscegenation. “Wait, I tell you!” 
cries Quentin, suggesting that he “would rather not discuss 
the issue that lies at the moral center of the Civil War,” and 
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is instead stuck within his own self-experience of history 
and unable to think deeply about the collective faults of the 
South (Faulkner 222; Jabbur 25). Nevertheless, at the end 
of the last chapter, Shreve expresses his moral judgment by 
theorizing about the Jim Bonds who will one day come to 
spread throughout the world; Quentin, however, expresses 
his unwillingness to hear what Shreve has to say. Instead of 
acquiescing to Quentin’s request, Shreve responds, “Then 
I’ll tell you” (qtd. In Jabbur 27). While Shreve reaches a 
sense of moral judgment, imagining the future and climbing 
outside his own individual self to enter the collective realm, 
Quentin is stuck in the past. 
 Quentin’s inability to reach sublimity is further 
reflected in his repetition of certain familiar stories, while 
Rosa, on the other hand, reaches the sublime through her 
ability to finally show compassion. While Quentin has 
already heard the story of Sutpen many times, as well as 
even encountered Henry Sutpen himself, he still feels the 
need to relate the story to Shreve. His excessive narrative 
repetition of the past reflects Freudian theory: what led 
Freud to the notion of the thanatos instinct was “the curious 
tendency he noted on the part of those suffering from severe 
trauma to relive the traumatic moment and to do so in 
various forms: in analysis, in dreams, in unconscious habits” 
(Hutcheon 269). Freud observed that “traumatized patients 
exhibited a ‘compulsion to repeat’ that had a drive-like 
quality about it, giving the appearance of some ‘daemonic’ 
force at work” (qtd. in Hutcheon 269-70). This idea makes 
sense considering that Quentin later resorts to suicide. 
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Yet what Freud’s notion reveals is that Quentin considers 
the Sutpen story and his experience seeing Henry to be a 
traumatic part of his own essential self. Thus, compelled to 
narrate and analyze the story of Sutpen over and over again, 
he is so wrapped up in his own internal psyche that he is 
unable to make any moral judgments that model a sense of 
the collective, universal truth resonating in Kant’s notion 
of the sublime. Contrary to Quentin, however, Rosa, while 
compulsively trapped within her almost uncontrollable 
rage and her hate for the Sutpen family, ultimately reaches 
a sense of meaning and sublimity when she returns to the 
home with an ambulance, intent on saving the dying Henry. 
This even resonates within Mr. Compson’s letter, where he 
imagines that she is finally able to realize that the “objects 
of the outrage and of the commiseration also are no longer 
ghosts but are actual people to be actual recipients of the 
hatred and the pity” (Faulkner 302). Rosa is able to imagine 
real humans where “ghosts” used to be, thus leading her to 
have compassion, something that Faulkner believed was 
one of the core attributes of humanity. However, Quentin 
seems to remain within a world bordering between past and 
present, light and dark, and, ultimately, his own ability to 
find meaning through the sublime. As Jabbur explains, 
“[w]hat Faulkner’s narrative presents is, indeed, the sublime: 
or, more correctly, a medium for experiencing our own 
sublimity even as Faulkner’s might-have-beens fail to 
experience theirs” (18). As many of the characters fail to 
reconcile “personal will and public responsibility” through 
sublimity and moral judgment, or conceiving of what 
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“might-have-been,” (just as Shreve conceives of the future 
and Rosa possibly ignites her “supersensible” faculty to 
imagine humans instead of ghosts), Faulkner creates art that 
encourages readers to transcend their own individual selves 
and consider the collective good. 
 Although Quentin’s traumatic repetition of the 
central narrative indicates his inability to achieve the 
sublime, the novel reveals a few instances where Shreve and 
even Quentin achieve an almost sublime, collective morality 
through their shared aesthetic experience of storytelling. 
As they narrate the story in their cold, Harvard dormitory, 
there are times when both characters seem to unify into one, 
whether it is finishing one another’s sentences or actually 
becoming indistinguishable from the text itself; moreover, 
Shreve especially seems to lose sight of his own individual 
ambitions, becoming so caught up in his curiosity about 
the story. As touched on previously, Sutpen’s childhood, 
where the land belonged to “anybody and everybody,” was 
characterized by a similar sense of collective morality, a kind 
of sublime state of equality and oneness between humans 
and the natural world. The interactions between Quentin and 
Shreve mirror this sense of oneness. 
 However, despite the fact that the act of storytelling 
offers temporary escape from the confines of the individual 
self, Faulkner makes it quite clear that Quentin ultimately 
fails to achieve a sense of the sublime. As Shreve offers 
evidence of sublimity through his moral judgments of the 
South and his imaginative prediction of the future, Quentin 
struggles to transcend his internal psyche:
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Quentin did not answer, staring at the window; then 
he could not tell if it was the actual window or the 
window’s pale rectangle upon his eyelids, though 
after a moment it began to emerge. It began to take 
shape in its same curious, light, gravity-defying 
attitude—the once-folded sheet out of the wisteria 
Mississippi summer, the cigar smell, the random 
blowing of the fireflies. . .It was becoming quite 
distinct; he would be able to decipher the words 
soon, in a moment; even almost now, now, now. 
(Faulkner 301)
While it first offers a glimpse of hope, suggesting that 
Quentin enters a collective “oneness” with the world around 
him (through the window), seeing the world in a new light, 
the passage quickly illustrates his failure to transcend his 
individuality. As Quentin recognizes the familiar image of 
the window, he once again falls back into his internal world 
and becomes doomed to relive the traumatic past. Finally, 
after Shreve comments on how Southerners “outlive” 
themselves, Quentin tries hard to decipher the “words,” 
suggesting his attempt to achieve a harmony between reason 
and imagination. His repetition of the word “now” illustrates 
his attempt to bring meaning from the past into the present; 
and yet, as the novel’s ending reveals, he internalizes his 
thoughts once again by repeating that he doesn’t hate the 
South, further emphasizing his inner conflict between the 
individual and the collective, between the past and the 
present. Quentin is hopelessly trapped within his internal 
world, unable to let go of his past and imagine a “fourteenth 
image” of universal truth. Like Sutpen, he fails to achieve 
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the sublime. However, Quentin is far from the obsessively 
selfish, individuated Sutpen: Quentin at least tries, almost 
desperately, to experience the sublime, lingering between 
the two worlds within the twilight. More importantly, his 
struggle in Absalom, Absalom! reveals more heartbreaking 
insight into another one of Faulkner’s beloved novels: 
Quentin’s same failure to reconcile the individual and the 
collective, the past and the future becomes the motivational 
force behind his tragic suicide in The Sound and the Fury. 
  In his Nobel Speech, Faulkner ascribes sublimity 
to the work of the poet: “He must teach himself that the 
basest of all things is to be afraid; and, teaching himself 
that, forget it forever, leaving no room in his workshop for 
anything but the old verities and truths of the heart, the old 
universal truths lacking which any story is ephemeral and 
doomed—love and honor and pity and pride and compassion 
and sacrifice” (nobelprize.org). Just as individuals first 
confront the sublime with feelings of tremendous fear and 
inadequacy, they eventually move beyond that condition 
as they exercise the harmonious interplay of reason and 
imagination, laboring in their “workshop” to create the 
unimaginable through a heightened sense of human morality. 
As Faulkner himself seemed to point out, these “verities 
and truths of the heart” are what bring humans together in 
a universal, moral framework of both individual freedom 
and collective responsibility—the essence of the sublime 
experience. Similarly, through the aesthetic experience of 
literature, Faulkner encourages the reader to use both reason 
and imagination to achieve a “supersensible” faculty of 
universal, human truth. 
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Understanding Death in Brown and Poe: 
Backgrounds and Continuities 
   
Anthony Cunder
Seton Hall University
South Orange, New Jersey
“Thus early had that one guest—the only guest 
who is certain, at one time or another, to find his 
way into every human dwelling—thus early had 
Death stepped across the threshold of the House 
of the Seven Gables!” (Hawthorne 8)
 
n Chris Wedge’s animated film, Epic, death is a villainous 
figure, personified in the form of Mandrake, the King 
of Rot. This contemporary interpretation asserts that death 
is a force that must be overcome by the life of the forest, 
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embodied by Queen Tara and her army of green Leafmen. 
Death is not welcome in the forest; it seeks only to destroy 
life. Mandrake speaks in the film of the “borders” erected 
around his island of Rot by the Leafmen, all “in the name 
of balance.” “Well, I’m sick of balance,” he says (Wedge). 
The solution Epic offers to the problem of death is to fight it. 
When death rebels against the boundaries set by life, it must 
be eradicated.
 While this response at first appears heroic, it 
presents a number of difficulties and complications regarding 
the presumed “defeat” of Death that are never resolved. For 
example, at the end of the film, the viewer never learns what 
happens to Mandrake’s island of Rot after he is absorbed into 
a tree. Is death truly eradicated? If so, will the denizens of 
the forest live forever? Will they retain their youth? 
 Though the film does not address these concerns, 
Epic engages with an essentially timeless problem that is 
treated in such early texts as Chaucer’s “Pardoner’s Tale” 
and emerges again in American gothic texts, such as Charles 
Brockden Brown’s Wieland and Edgar Allan Poe’s “The 
Black Cat.” All three offer a similar, alternative answer to 
Chris Wedge’s villainous characterization of death. Their 
answers acknowledge death as undesirable but also concede 
that it is a necessary function in the mechanics of the world. 
In Chaucer’s tale, for example, three rambunctious young 
men go out to seek Death in the hopes of killing him—“we 
wol sleen this false traitour Deeth” (PTl. 699)—but cannot 
avoid his grasp.  Similarly, Brown and Poe reach back 
into the treasure trove of folklore and medieval narrative 
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to comment on the nature of a reality that is impossible to 
escape. 
 S.G.F. Brandon, in “The Personification of 
Death in Some Ancient Religions,” points to Paleolithic 
understandings of death, particularly in the burial rituals 
known to be a part of early cultures. Such “mortuary 
practice,” he suggests, “whatever its origin may be thought 
to have been…must presuppose some reflection about death, 
which would surely in turn have involved some speculation 
about the cause of death” (317). Even from such early 
stages of human history, death played a significant role in 
society and in cultivating attitudes toward life and the future 
in general. Brandon goes on to conclude that “Paleolithic 
peoples were likely to have inferred that death by disease 
must be due to the attack of some agent whom they could not 
see, but of whose activity they had such doleful proof” (318). 
It is important to consider how attitudes and perspectives 
towards death have evolved over the ages and to examine 
the warnings implicit in texts such as Chaucer’s, Brown’s, 
and Poe’s in relation to the view of death as a sentient being, 
orchestrating and planning the end of life as Mandrake does.  
 In Chaucer’s tale, Death holds power over the 
rioters, despite their arrogant declaration that they will 
find and destroy it. This power is revealed especially in 
the youngest of the three. After the rioters embark on their 
quest to seek Death, they are informed by an Old Man they 
encounter upon the road that Death awaits them under a 
nearby tree. The Old Man himself seeks Death, although 
he cannot find it, claiming that “deeth, allas, ne wol not han 
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[his] lif” (PT l. 727); that he must walk “lik a restelees caitif 
[as longe time as it is Goddes wille]” (PT ll. 726-28). Here, 
Death is something desired, a conclusion for which the Old 
Man longs but which he cannot find. While a contemporary 
film such as Epic would celebrate the Old Man’s immunity 
from Death, “The Pardoner’s Tale” uses it to highlight the 
difficulties of immortality without eternal youth, showing the 
consequences of endless life that necessarily brings with it 
the unavoidable and debilitating complications of old age. 
 Yet, while the Old Man cannot find Death, Chaucer’s 
three rioters have no such trouble. Upon reaching the grove, 
they discover baskets of gold, Death embodied within the 
guise of greed. The youngest of the three is tasked with 
returning to town for food and drink while the other two 
remain with the gold until nightfall. Once the youngest 
leaves, the others plan to kill him when he returns so that the 
treasure might be divided among two rather than three (PT ll. 
760-836). The youngest, enthralled by a similar selfish desire 
for the gold, says,
O Lord…if so were that I mighte
Have al this tresor to myself allone,
Ther is no man that liveth under the trone
Of God that shoulde live so mirye as I! 
(PT ll. 840-4)   
The subsequent three lines are particularly significant. 
Chaucer writes, “And atte laste the feend, oure enemy, / 
Putte in his thoght that he shoulde poison beye, / With which 
he mighte sleen his felawes tweye” (PT ll. 844-6). Notably, 
it is Death—“the fiend, our enemy”—that gives this rioter 
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the idea to buy poison and kill his companions. However, it 
is not an idea that materializes spontaneously. Instead, Death 
is able to manipulate the man’s already murderous thoughts, 
cultivating the seed planted there. The young rioter becomes 
Death’s agent, chosen not randomly or arbitrarily but rather 
because of his predisposition toward killing. 
 Another aspect of Chaucer’s commentary on death is 
its reality in the lives of mankind and a warning against any 
attempt to destroy Death as the rioters seek to do. Elizabeth 
Hatcher writes of Chaucer’s young men as follows:
idealistic simpletons, they intend to create a utopia 
of life without death in one ironically death-dealing 
stroke. When they have slain Death, no one will 
ever die again—and the world will therefore be 
perfect….[T]his plan parodies Christ’s redemptive 
act:…his [death] overcame the death of the soul 
whereas theirs aims to overcome the death of the 
body; his preserved but transcended the natural 
mortality of the individual whereas theirs aims to 
subvert the state of nature. (247 emphasis added) 
In attempting to create a perfect world in which no one dies, 
the rioters ignore the consequences that such an attempt will 
bring, creating a world in which people live endlessly—and 
at the same time, suffer forever the pains of old age. 
 Authors in the American gothic tradition also 
attempt to understand how death may be a necessary part of 
life, counteracting the prevailing sentiments of optimism, 
progress, clarity and order typical of the Age of Reason. 
They rekindle the emotions connected with death, and in 
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doing so, they attempt to discredit imprudent efforts to 
evade the Reaper’s call. This sentiment finds expression in 
the depiction of death, since it can strike anywhere at any 
time, often without cause or explanation. In the gothic tale, 
death acquires its own countenance, its own voice, and its 
own character that gives it a personality, a substance, and 
an agency. However, it is not an agency without purpose, as 
Gary Farnell, in “Gothic’s Death Drive,” reveals. Quoting 
Pope Pius VI, Farnell writes, “In all living beings the 
principle of life is no other than that of death: at the same 
time we receive the one we receive the other, we nourish 
both within us, side by side” (592). This juxtaposition of life 
and death offers a way of viewing death as essential to life, a 
concept manipulated and embraced by gothic writers. 
 In Wieland, death has a voice that ultimately 
convinces Theodore Wieland to become its agent. Chapter 
Nineteen begins with Wieland producing his defense against 
the charge of murdering his wife and children. He does 
not deny the act. In fact, he says, “You know that they are 
dead, and that they were killed by me. What more would 
you have?”  It is as if his will is somehow being subverted 
or manipulated by an external force. In fact, while she is 
being attacked by Wieland, Catharine refers to his having 
been possessed by “a fury resistless and horrible” (ch. 
19), suggesting that Wieland is, in fact, controlled by 
some other being. Wieland himself also indicates a lack of 
agency, claiming that “to rebel against [his] mandate was 
impossible” (ch. 19). Some power overcomes his free will, 
issuing a mandate that consumes him. That power is death 
itself.
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 Quoting a text from the Greco-Roman period, 
Brandon expands upon the notion of death’s calling: 
“Everyone to whom [Death] calleth comes to him 
straightaway, their hearts being affrighted through fear of 
him…Yet he turns not his face towards [those who petition 
him], he comes not to him who implores him, he hearkens 
not when he is worshipped; he shows himself not, even 
though any manner of bribe be given him” (321). This 
echoes the plight of Chaucer’s Old Man and also provides a 
context in which to examine Brown’s text. In Wieland, Clara, 
the text’s narrator and Wieland’s sister, also at times seems 
to be calling for death, but it is a plea fueled by motives 
different from the Old Man’s. Through much of the story, 
Clara Wieland expresses a concern about her impending 
doom, especially a preoccupation about the uncertain time 
and nature by which it might take place. Clara proclaims, 
“Death must happen to all. Whether our felicity was to be 
subverted by it tomorrow, or whether it was ordained that we 
should lay down our heads full of years and of honor, was 
a question that no human being could solve” (ch. 6). Her 
concern appears to be centered on the seemingly arbitrary 
and capricious nature of death rather than the ailments and 
pains of the Old Man who desires Death as a release from 
the infirmities of advanced age. Clara provides an answer 
to the Old Man’s dilemma: “Men can deliberately untie the 
thread of life” (ch. 25), even admitting that she had “deemed 
herself capable [of it] (ch. 25). Suicide, then, appears as a 
solution to the uncertainty of when death will strike and 
a means by which one can find release.  It responds to 
64
the arbitrariness of a sentient Death who seems to assert 
complete control over the lives of men, deciding when and 
where they will pass from this life into the next.  
 But it is a problematic answer, a fallacy of self-
empowerment that does not free one from the power of 
death. Clara, at one point, views her penknife as a method 
by which she can “baffle [her] assailant, and prevent the 
crime by destroying [herself]” (ch. 10). Clara’s fear of the 
unknown—of what Carwin might do to her—compels her 
to seek refuge in an equally uncertain course of action. 
The path that lies beyond death’s gate is as inscrutable as 
what might lie in wait behind Clara’s closet door. Yet, in 
contemplating suicide, Clara attempts to assert her own 
autonomy, leaving the choice of life and death not in her 
assailant’s hands (or death’s) but her own. Her self-agency 
is valued more than her life. But Clara’s desire for death 
is problematized further when one recognizes her age and 
condition. While the Old Man in the “Pardoner’s Tale” 
may have a valid reason for seeking Death, Clara is still 
in her prime, with the potential for a full life ahead of her. 
Though both Clara and the Old Man seek death, the latter 
demonstrates the folly of seeking physical immortality while 
the former highlights the folly of an undue fear of death—in 
fearing the power and inscrutability of death, Clara nearly 
submits to it, sooner than would have been, by nature, 
required of her. 
 To further press this fear of an arbitrary and 
capricious death, Brown writes that, when Theodore Wieland 
goes to his sister’s house to discover if any 
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ill-thing has happened to her, he [Wieland] encounters 
a vision, “luminous and glowing. It was the element of 
heaven that flowed around,” Wieland claims. “Nothing but 
a fiery stream was at first visible; but, anon, a shrill voice 
from behind called upon me to attend” (ch. 19). This voice 
subsequently convinces Wieland to kill his wife, coaxing 
him into murder just as Death encouraged Chaucer’s young 
rioter to do the same. However, in Wieland, death is not 
an image of darkness. It is not a “fiend, our enemy,” a 
Reaper shrouded and cloaked, as Chaucer presents it in the 
“Pardoner’s Tale,” or a heap of gold that embodies death 
in the sins of greed and gluttony. Instead, it is a depicted 
as light and is strangely reminiscent of God. Described by 
Wieland as “the element of heaven,” a “fiery stream” that 
engulfs him yet does not burn him as it did his father (ch. 
19), this conflation of death and heaven may suggest that 
the two are interchangeable. Wieland tells Clara that “if a 
devil has deceived [him], he came in the habit of an angel” 
(ch. 25). But how can an angel demand death, unless it is 
the Angel of Death? Clara questions the events surrounding 
her father’s mysterious demise, wondering if it is “fresh 
proof that the Divine Ruler interferes in human affairs, 
meditates an end, selects, and commissions his agents, and 
enforces, by unequivocal sanctions, submission to his will” 
(ch. 2).  Brown explores the source of death by questioning 
its character and suggests, through Clara, that perhaps the 
source of life is also the source of death, building upon 
Chaucer’s depiction while at the same time establishing a 
fresh perspective. 
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 In traditional Hebrew philosophy regarding 
mortality, “God is regarded as ultimately responsible for [an] 
individual’s death…Consequently…the dominant view is 
that death is due to the action of God. However, the tendency 
to separate Yahweh from direct contact with human affairs 
seems to have produced the idea of ‘the angel of Yahweh’ as 
the agent of death” (Brandon 325). This correlation between 
death and the divine as apparent coadjutors hearkens back 
to the exclamation of Chaucer’s Old Man, “God yow se” 
(PT l. 715): “may God protect you,” even as he sends the 
rioters to their deaths. Thus Death does its work, perhaps 
under the mantle of God himself, with the giver of life and 
the taker of it operating in tandem. In Chapter Nineteen of 
Wieland, Wieland tells Catharine, “I was commissioned to 
kill thee, but not to torment thee with the foresight of thy 
death; not to multiply thy fears, and prolong thy agonies.” 
Death as a servant of heaven does not intend to “torment, 
multiply fears, or prolong agonies”; however, these aspects 
of death are often inescapable and may lead to the barriers 
that arise between contemplations of the horrors of death and 
meditations on the paradise of heaven. 
 This distinction, nevertheless, ignores the fact that 
in order to reach heaven one must first pass through death’s 
gate. Gary Farnell pushes the argument further, asserting that 
aspects of Freud’s own theory of the human “death drive” 
allude to “the interlinking of destruction and creation in an 
apparent drive within Nature towards death itself” (596). 
In Theodore Wieland’s case, it is true that he has brutally 
murdered his wife; but at the same time, he has, presumably, 
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pushed her through death’s door into the heavenly paradise, 
attainable only through the reality of human destruction.  A 
world of physical immortality as sought after by Chaucer’s 
three rioters “would have no heavenly afterlife to inspire its 
inhabitants to charity,” as Elizabeth Hatcher explains (248). 
This paradox of death as the necessary precipitate for entry 
into paradise is embodied in the gothic, a genre that subverts 
the notion that, despite the sacrifices required for progress, 
a reasonable balance between happiness and sadness might 
be found, rejecting Enlightenment ideals that privilege 
happiness in this life and discount the necessity of death and 
its function in bringing one truly to eternal peace.
 Thus, Theodore Wieland becomes a model for this 
system, killing not only his wife and children but also his 
emotions as a husband and father, suppressing the “raptures 
known only to the man whose parental and conjugal love 
is without limits” (ch. 19), reinterpreting the traditional 
happiness found in marriage and parenthood in order to 
achieve a higher form of happiness. Brown also replaces 
the customary darkness of morbidity with an environment 
“luminous and glowing” (ch. 19), vaulting death into a 
position of dominance and superiority while emphasizing 
a death that, although powerful and necessary, is also, at 
times, arbitrary. Wieland’s final role as death’s agent, then, 
is to take his own life (ch. 26), using the knife that Clara 
considered for her own destruction. Wieland reaffirms 
Clara’s earlier sentiments that death indeed has a “hand 
invisible and of preternatural strength” and that “all places 
were alike accessible to this foe” (ch. 9), even the hearts and 
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minds of his agents and victims. 
 In “Literature and the Impossibility of Death: Poe’s 
‘Berenice,’” Arthur Brown draws from Poe’s perceptions of 
death to argue that, in dying, humans “leave behind not only 
the world but also death…ceasing to be man…ceasing to 
be mortal” (449), as if mankind’s inherent aversion toward 
death comes not from what it may bring or the unknown 
that may lie in wait behind death’s door but simply from the 
fact that once that door is passed through and the threshold 
is crossed, it can never be crossed again. The end of life 
marks the beginning of “undying death,” which is “real in 
its incarnation as writing” (Brown 449). Undying death is 
more than spiritual or physical immortality: it is the pain and 
torment of the Old Man, wasting away, lamenting, “Lo, how 
I vanisshe, flessh and blood and skin” (PT l. 733), his sorrow 
preserved eternally in Chaucer’s language. 
  “Death is a mystery which fascinates and repels…
It is sublime because it remains a terrifying mystery, not 
simply unknowable but linked with human desires that we 
wish to keep unknown,” writes David Morris (309). This 
paradox exists in Clara, in her fluctuating attraction to death 
and repulsion by it. She argues that “[t]he will is the tool of 
the understanding, which must fashion its conclusions on the 
notices of the sense” (ch. 4). If death remains a mystery, then 
a misunderstanding of it can lead to a corruption of the will, 
the greatest and most powerful means by which death can 
terrorize humanity. Death, as an unseen presence, is difficult 
to understand via the senses. The effects are discernible, 
but their cause—particularly until the advent of modern 
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science—remains inscrutable, as Theodore Wieland often 
asserts. Hence, a faulty understanding becomes the medium 
by which Wieland loses his agency and becomes death’s 
agent. The predominant fear in the text, and the point that 
the story seems to make, revolves around the arbitrariness 
of death and the lack of control available to humanity 
when faced with its call. This does not suggest that death is 
inherently evil. On the contrary, a misunderstanding of death 
seems to be the greater evil, and one by which Wieland’s will 
is corrupted. 
 In Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Black Cat,” death does 
not appear as a heavenly light but rather in the guise of the 
narrator’s first cat, appropriately named Pluto after the Greek 
god of the underworld. Of all the other pets supposedly 
loved by the narrator, this cat is the only one whose name is 
provided: “Pluto—this was the cat’s name” (79). To explore 
the ways in which the story attempts to reveal underlying 
truths about death through the figure of Pluto, it is important 
to examine several elements of the tale: Pluto’s death and 
apparent reincarnation in the appearance of the second cat; 
the narrator’s attitude toward Pluto and his successor; the 
event that leads to the murder of the narrator’s wife; and, 
finally, the circumstances surrounding the narrator’s capture 
and implied demise via the gallows. 
 When the narrator describes his desire to kill Pluto, 
despite his former love for the feline, he says:
And then came, as if to my final and irrevocable 
overthrow, the spirit of PERVERSENESS. Of this 
spirit, philosophy takes no account…Who has not, 
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a hundred times, found himself committing a vile 
or a silly action, for no other reason than because 
he knows he should not? Have we not a perpetual 
inclination…to violate that which is Law, merely 
because we understand it to be such? This spirit of 
perverseness, I say, came to my final overthrow. It 
was this unfathomable longing of the soul to vex 
itself—to offer violence to its own nature—to do 
wrong for wrong’s sake only—that urged me to 
continue and finally to consummate the injury I had 
inflicted upon the unoffending brute. One morning, 
in cool blood, I slipped a noose about its neck and 
hung it to the limb of a tree. (80)
The first element of this passage that deserves attention is 
the narrator’s proclaimed “spirit of perverseness.” According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, one who is perverse can 
be described as “going or disposed to go against what is 
reasonable, logical, expected, or required; contrary, fickle, 
irrational.” The word is derived from the Latin perversus, 
meaning “turned the wrong way, awry, unnatural, abnormal, 
wrong-headed, misguided, perverted.” If the narrator wants 
to kill Pluto—embodying an underlying desire to kill 
death—can the narrator’s actions and desires be defined as 
“perverse”? Is killing death illogical?
 Indeed it is, since it contradicts the very nature of 
what death is. As the ruler of the dead, death itself cannot 
be killed, or else it must necessarily submit to its own rule, 
contradicting the essence of sovereignty. This paradox leads 
to the second element of the passage: the notion that the 
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narrator represents a desire to violate some “law” merely 
because it is such. The law of nature requires all living 
beings to submit, at one time or another, to the power of 
death. Any attempt to evade such power indefinitely is 
contrary to natural law—it is perverse.
 And yet, Pluto—death—avoids the narrator 
prior to the atrocious act. Pluto “fled in extreme terror at 
[the narrator’s] approach” (80), an act which ultimately 
leads, according to the narrator, to the advent of the spirit 
of perverseness. Could the avoidance of death be what 
truly irritated the narrator? Knowing that death lurked 
behind closed doors, yet refused to reveal itself plainly? 
The narrator claims that a third element to this spirit of 
perverseness is the “longing of the soul to vex itself—to offer 
violence to its own nature” (80). If the violence the narrator 
will soon perpetrate is truly against his own soul—his own 
nature—then death must be a part of that nature. Pluto’s 
avoidance perturbs the narrator since it is a part of himself 
that flees at his approach.  In Greek mythology, Pluto is 
not simply the god of the underworld but also “a god of the 
earth’s fertility” (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia).  This, 
at first, seems to be a contradiction.  However, the processes 
of nature may provide an explanation. The world often 
requires death to invigorate new life: animals must die to 
feed carnivores; vegetation must die to feed herbivores; the 
cycle of life requires death to play a part, and any attempt 
to destroy or kill death must necessarily be an attempt to 
kill life as well. Joseph J. Moldenhauer describes Poe’s 
own cosmology as one “in which Beauty, Goodness, and 
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Truth are a Unity—with Death” (qtd. in Thompson 297). 
The application is relevant here, where “The Black Cat” 
links death with goodness; the narrator both loves and hates 
Pluto, and thus both loves and hates death. In truth, Pluto is 
something of a neutral character, acted upon by the narrator 
yet never displaying any overt aggression or evil of his own. 
This portrayal of death, as does Wieland’s, suggests that 
death is not inherently evil, but nor is it inherently good. 
It is simply a fact of life, an inevitable reality that remains 
hidden, unseen, oftentimes ignored, and almost universally 
avoided. 
  Thus, the reality of death is never truly unveiled 
until one’s time has come, perhaps not even then, as “there 
is none can see him, either of gods or men” (Brandon 321). 
The narrator is granted this special privilege of seeing 
death, though he scorns it. Pluto’s successor follows the 
narrator “with a pertinacity which it would be difficult to 
make the reader comprehend” (Poe 83). Yet, rather than 
accept the affections of the cat, the narrator “avoid[s] the 
creature” and “[flees] silently from its odious presence, as 
from the breath of a pestilence” (Poe 82). The narrator sees 
the cat/death as a dreadful creature, despite its intrinsic 
necessity. After he kills Pluto—a futile attempt to kill death 
itself—he soon understands that death has returned to 
haunt him. The unnamed new cat sports a white mark on its 
chest, a mark that “by slow degrees…assumed a rigorous 
distinctness of outline. It was now the representation of an 
object…, the image of a hideous—of a ghastly thing—of the 
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GALLOWS!—oh, mournful and terrible engine of Horror 
and of Crime—of Agony and of Death!” (Poe 83).     
 This nightmare of death surrounds the narrator, 
overwhelms him, and ultimately seduces him into becoming 
death’s agent because he cannot bring himself to accept 
death as a necessary condition of life. He attempts, as he did 
before, to kill the cat and rid himself of death, to evade it 
despite the fact that it is most certainly part of him, as it is 
part of everyone. He says, “Evil thoughts became my sole 
intimates” (Poe 83), and, “uplifting an axe…I aimed a blow 
at the animal which…would have proved instantly fatal had 
it descended as I wished” (84).  Yet, it does not, and, enraged 
by his wife’s interference, the narrator “withdrew [his] arm 
from her grasp and buried the axe in her brain” (84). He is 
goaded not only by his wife’s interference but also by death’s 
provocation in the form of the gallows-branded cat, “which 
had been the cause of so much wretchedness” (85). Murder, 
therefore, becomes an “aesthetic act, for it is One with 
the design of the Universe as Poe describes it in Eureka” 
(Thompson 297).  The narrator is absorbed by an obsession 
with death, one that is not entirely in conflict with the design 
of the universe, since all must die. However, the narrator’s 
aesthetic inclinations go awry when he perversely directs his 
death drive towards death itself. 
 Continuing in his rage, he experiences a fervent 
urge to kill his cat, “but it appeared that the crafty animal 
had been alarmed at the violence of [his] previous anger, 
and forbore to present itself in [his] present mood” (85). The 
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narrator fails to learn from his previous mistake, a hubristic 
one in which he attempts to place himself equal to God in 
having the ability to kill death.  He laments that a cat could 
cause “for [him]—for [him] a man, fashioned in the image 
of the High God—so much of insufferable woe!” (83). But 
it is not for man to destroy death, since this is reserved only 
to God. In St. Paul’s writings, Death—Thanatos—is “the 
last enemy that will be destroyed,” being part of a “hierarchy 
of demonic beings evidently hostile to God, that the 
Messiah would ultimately subjugate” (Brandon 330-1). This 
necessarily precludes any human being from killing death, 
especially before the end-time, since this would assume a 
level of power equal to that of the Messiah. The narrator, in 
his hubris, attempts to assume this authority by killing Pluto, 
thereby upsetting the balance of life and death in the world.  
 Death’s final appearance in the story—its ultimate 
victory—comes when it secures the narrator’s discovery by 
the police, calling attention to the wall in which death itself 
is now entombed, with a “wailing shriek, half of horror and 
half of triumph, such as might have arisen only out of hell, 
conjointly from the throats of the damned in their agony and 
of the demons that exult in the damnation” (Poe 86). The 
mingling of diametrically opposed traits appears once more 
with a final relish: the cat juxtaposes horror and triumph, 
suffering and exultation. As G. R. Thompson argues, 
“one cannot claim for the fascinated vision of death and 
dissolution in Poe’s writings a totally ecstatic and beatific 
vision. To claim such would be as serious a misreading of 
Poe as that of those critics Moldenhauer wishes to correct” 
75
(297). Though death at first seems neutral, even benign, 
when threatened by the narrator with a perverse attempt at 
destruction, it returns with a vengeance, punishing those who 
seek to pervert the natural order and escape—or destroy—
death.  
 In Wieland and “The Black Cat,” death interacts 
with the other characters, eliciting emotions, responses, 
and even dialogue. The character of death in these two 
texts offers new forms, new modes of viewing mortality, 
building upon medieval representations that fashion death 
as a fact of life. Though both of these gothic texts make this 
concession, they also highlight certain elements of death that 
generate concern and fear, namely its supposed arbitrariness 
and the lack of human control when death calls its victims. 
Despite new depictions of death as a luminous light or as 
an affectionate black cat, its basic character remains much 
the same, with slight modifications in each tale. In Wieland, 
Brown questions the nature of death; Wieland “was much 
conversant with the history of religious opinions, and 
took pains to ascertain their validity…to settle the relation 
between motives and actions, the criterion of merit, and 
the kinds and properties of evidence” (Ch. 3). He sees the 
“future, either as anterior, or subsequent to death, [as] a 
scene that required some preparation and provision to be 
made for it” and he had a “propensity to ruminate on these 
truths” (Ch. 3). Wieland ponders the reality and nature of 
death instead of enjoying life and living it to the fullest. 
He does not espouse an outright desire to slay death as do 
Chaucer’s medieval rioters or Poe’s narrator; however, his 
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curiosity about and investigation into the nature of death 
resemble the inquiry of the rioter who demanded of his 
knave, “Go bet…and axe redily / What cors is this, that 
passeth heer forby; / And looke that thow reporte his name 
wel” (PT ll. 667-9). Wieland worries about life’s changeable 
elements, resembling his father particularly in regard to his 
sense that “the vicissitudes of human life were accustomed 
to be viewed” (Ch. 3). Death, then, chooses as its victim one 
who obsesses over the nature of life after death rather than 
one who appreciates and relishes the life given him on earth. 
 “The Black Cat” highlights a similar injunction 
against fighting the reality of death. The narrator chooses to 
reject the natural order of the world—to “subvert the state of 
nature”—and in doing so escalates his own encounter with 
mortality. Had the narrator accepted Pluto/death in his life 
without the perverseness that prompted him to murder, then 
death would likely have coexisted with him for many more 
peaceful years to come. However, because the narrator could 
not accept death as a fact of life, the Reaper engages him 
as his agent, subverting his will and destroying his agency. 
The gothic genre suggests a subtle balance between life and 
death, a balance that Epic loudly rejects, attributing heroism, 
rather, to the one who destroys death. The gothic contends 
that while death is a necessary reality of life, it should not 
overwhelm or consume our lives. At the same time, it must 
also be acknowledged and given its due credit, for those 
who deny death also deny life, as those in Chaucer’s tale, 
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